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We prove the security of the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol in the
case where the source and detector are under the limited control of an adversary. Our proof applies
when both the source and the detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as is typical in practical
implementations of the protocol. We derive a general lower bound on the asymptotic key generation
rate for weakly basis-dependent eavesdropping attacks, and also estimate the rate in some special
cases: sources that emit weak coherent states with random phases, detectors with basis-dependent
efficiency, and misaligned sources and detectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of quantum cryptography is founded on
principles of fundamental physics, rather than assump-
tions about the resources available to a potential adver-
sary. In the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [1],
two parties (Alice and Bob) establish a secret key about
which the eavesdropper (Eve) cannot obtain a significant
amount of information. Alice sends a key bit to Bob by
preparing a qubit in one of two conjugate bases and Bob
measures the qubit in one of the two bases; Eve, who
does not know the basis chosen by Alice or by Bob, can-
not collect information about the key without producing
a detectable disturbance. This protocol, when suitably
augmented by classical error correction and privacy am-
plification, is provably secure against any attack by Eve
allowed by quantum mechanics [2–6].
Though security can be proven without imposing any
restriction on Eve’s attack (other than the requirement
that she has no a priori information about the basis
used), it is necessary to place conditions on the perfor-
mance of the source and detector employed in the pro-
tocol. In the Shor-Preskill proof [5], it is assumed that
any flaws in the source and detector can be absorbed into
Eve’s basis-independent attack. In the proof by Mayers
[2], the source is assumed to be perfect, but the detec-
tor is completely uncharacterized. In the Koashi-Preskill
proof [6], the detector is perfect, but the source is un-
characterized, aside from the proviso that it leaks no in-
formation about the basis choice to Eve. In all of these
cases, serious faults in the apparatus can be detected in
the protocol, so that Alice and Bob will reject the key if
the equipment performs badly.
But none of these proofs apply when both the source
and detector have small imperfections that depend on
the basis used in the protocol, the case relevant to typical
real-world implementations of quantum key distribution.
Since the BB84 protocol with perfect sources and detec-
tors is secure, it is intuitively clear that BB84 should re-
main secure if the imperfections are “sufficiently small.”
We will sharpen this intuition into a quantitative state-
ment, by calculating how the rate of generation of private
key depends on the tolerance to which the equipment is
characterized.
The simplest way to analyze the consequences of char-
acterized imperfections is to absorb the defective perfor-
mance of the equipment into the eavesdropper’s attack.
Primarily for this reason, we are led to consider the secu-
rity of the BB84 protocol in a different framework than
in previous security proofs: the flaws in the source and
detector may depend on the bases chosen, and further-
more Eve may know these bases, but her power to exploit
this knowledge is limited. We will prove security under
an assumption that limits the basis dependence of Eve’s
attack.
It is natural to ask whether this assumption can be ver-
ified by conducting suitable tests on the source and detec-
tor (perhaps with testing equipment that is also not fully
trustworthy, as in [7]). For now we put aside the issue of
testing the equipment, and we will trust that our equip-
ment performs approximately as expected. However, as
cautious cryptologists we will assume that, within the
prescribed limits, the performance of the equipment is
controlled by Eve and maximally exploited by her to gain
information about the shared key.
Our analysis follows the method of Shor and Preskill
[5], who proved the security of BB84 by relating it to an
entanglement distillation protocol. Their argument ex-
ploited a symmetry between the two bases used in the
protocol, whose consequence is that the entangled pairs
to be distilled have equal rates of bit errors and phase
errors. Our task in this paper is to extend the analy-
sis to the case where the symmetry between the bases is
broken because the adversary has information about the
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basis used. We will give a general argument showing that
if the basis-dependence of the attack is sufficiently weak,
then the gap between the bit error rate and the phase
error rate is small; this argument allows us to establish
security against arbitrary attacks that satisfy a particu-
lar criterion for weak basis dependence, and to derive a
lower bound on the asymptotic key generation rate.
To formulate our criterion for the attack to be weakly
basis dependent, we focus on the coin that is flipped to
determine the basis — the basis dependence is weak if
the adversary interacts only weakly with the coin. The
Shor-Preskill argument shows that, for the purpose of an-
alyzing the security of BB84, it is convenient to imagine
that Alice chooses each of her key bits by measuring half
of an entangled state, and that she delays these measure-
ments until after Eve has attacked the signals. Likewise,
for analyzing weakly basis-dependent attacks, we find it
convenient to imagine that the coin flip that determines
the basis is realized by measuring a qubit, and that this
measurement is delayed until after the adversary’s attack.
Then we can quantify the extent of the adversary’s inter-
actions with the coin according to how much the state of
the coin is disturbed. Our general argument shows that
if the disturbance of the coin is slight, then a secure key
can be generated at a calculable nonzero rate.
Aside from presenting this general argument, we will
also apply our methods to a few specific scenarios in
which quantum key distribution is executed with imper-
fect devices. In some of these special cases, we can derive
tighter lower bounds on the key generation rate than are
obtained by the general argument. The examples we dis-
cuss include:
Tagging. A faulty source may “tag” some of the qubits
with information, readable by the eavesdropper,
that reveals the basis used in the preparation. An
important special case, also recently analyzed by
Inamori, Lu¨tkenhaus and Mayers [8], is a source
emitting weak coherent states which with nonnegli-
gible probability contain multiple photons prepared
in the same polarization state. An adversary might
intercept the extra photons and collect information
about the basis used without causing any distur-
bance, compromising security.
Basis-dependent detector efficiency. If the detector
sometimes misfires, the probability that a qubit
is successfully detected might depend on the basis
used. An adversary that can control whether the
detector fires can use this power to disguise eaves-
dropping.
Basis-dependent misalignment in the source or detec-
tor. The source or detector might not be properly
aligned to emit or detect a qubit in the desired ba-
sis. The adversary can exploit her freedom to rotate
these devices to reduce the disturbance caused by
her eavesdropping.
Our results do not subsume, nor are they subsumed
by, the results of [2,6,8]. Mayers and Koashi-Preskill as-
sume that the detector or source is uncharacterized, but
that the adversary is unable to influence the behavior of
the devices to suit her purposes. We assume that the
flaws in the devices are limited, but that the adversary
controls the apparatus within these limits; furthermore,
our security proof (unlike the Koashi-Preskill proof) ap-
plies to a source that leaks a small amount of information
about the choice of basis. And more important, while
Mayers assumes that the source is perfect, and Koashi
and Preskill assume that the detector is perfect, our new
techniques apply when both the source and the detec-
tor have small basis-dependent imperfections, the generic
case in practical settings. In addition, while Koashi and
Preskill assume that the signals emitted by Alice’s source
are uncorrelated with one another (the state describing
the emission of n signals is a tensor product of n indi-
vidual signals), and while Mayers likewise assumes that
the signals are detected individually rather than collec-
tively by Bob, our results are not inherently subject to
such limitations. (However, we do assume that the sig-
nals are emitted and detected individually in many of the
examples that we analyze.)
Aspects of the security of quantum key distribution in
realistic settings have been analyzed previously [9–14].
However, our proof of security holds for arbitrary collec-
tive attacks by the eavesdropper, while individual attacks
were considered in most previous work. (An important
exception is the recent study by Inamori, Lu¨tkenhaus and
Mayers [8] of sources that emit weak coherent states.) Al-
though our results do not yet constitute a definitive anal-
ysis of the security of realistic quantum cryptography, we
expect that the tools we have developed will prove useful
in further studies.
Beyond any of our particular results, we have broad-
ened notably the domain of applicability of the Shor-
Preskill method for proving security. This method has
many further applications, and in particular allows one to
easily analyze the effectiveness of various enhancements
of the protocol such as two-way postprocessing [15].
Our findings are of both practical and conceptual in-
terest. It is important to address whether practical im-
plementations of quantum key distribution are truly se-
cure, and in real-world implementations the apparatus is
never flawless. And apart from practical concerns, quan-
tum key distribution provides a fascinating theoretical
laboratory for quantitatively exploring the unavoidable
tradeoff between collecting information about a quantum
system and disturbing the system.
We note that the security against arbitrary eavesdrop-
ping attacks of quantum key distribution performed with
imperfect devices has also been analyzed by Ben-Or [16].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
we clarify the setting of our analysis by introducing Eve’s
collaborator Fred, who controls the flaws in the source
and detector. We review the connection between the
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BB84 protocol and entanglement-based quantum key dis-
tribution in Sec. III, and reprise the Shor-Preskill argu-
ment which is the foundation for all that follows. We
carefully formulate our models for sources and detectors
in Sec. IV, and point out in Sec. V some ways in which
these models fail to capture fully the properties of real
devices. In Sec. VI we introduce the concept of a quan-
tum coin, which is a useful tool for analyzing the power
of Fred’s basis-dependent attack on the equipment, and
in Sec. VII we present our security proof for a general
class of attacks that depend sufficiently weakly on the
basis. We then proceed to explore various applications
of this result: In Sec. VIII, we prove security for the case
where the detector is perfect but the source has small
generic flaws, and in Sec. IX, we treat the case where
the detector has small flaws and the source is flawed but
oblivious; that is, it leaks no information about the ba-
sis used. Sec. X analyzes the case where the source and
detector are both slightly misaligned, and in Sec. XI we
state without proof a result for the case where the both
the source and detector have small generic flaws (where
the source is not necessarily oblivious). The case in which
a fraction of the signals emitted by the source are tagged
with basis information is dealt with in Sec. XII; this anal-
ysis is relevant to sources that emit weak coherent states
with random phases, sources that are close to single pho-
ton sources, and a scenario where some of the basis and
key bits are selected by flipping biased coins. Finally,
in Sec. XIII we discuss the case of a detector with im-
perfect efficiency that is controlled by the adversary, and
Sec. XIV contains some concluding comments.
II. ALICE AND BOB AND EVE AND FRED
To clarify our assumptions about the source and detec-
tor imperfections, it is helpful to imagine that two collab-
orating adversaries are trying to foil the key distribution
protocol: Eve and Fred. The goal of Alice and Bob is
to generate a shared key not known to the Eve/Fred al-
liance.
Fred knows the basis chosen by Alice and/or Bob, and
he can tamper with the source and/or detector, but only
within certain prescribed limits. Because the basis de-
pendence of his attack is limited, Fred can acquire only
limited knowledge of what signal was emitted by the
source and what outcome was recorded by the detector.
Eve on the other hand has no a priori knowledge of
the basis chosen by Alice or by Bob, and she has no di-
rect control over the source or the detector. But Eve is
permitted to attack all of the signals sent by Alice to
Bob collectively in any manner allowed by quantum me-
chanics. For example, Eve may entangle an ancilla that
she controls with each signal after the signal is emitted
by the source and before it is absorbed by the detector.
Then Eve may delay the measurement of her ancilla until
after all public discussion by Alice and Bob is concluded,
choosing her measurement to optimize her information
about the key.
While Eve can send to Fred any quantum or classical
message of her choice, communication from Fred to Eve
is restricted. Before Eve interacts with the signals, Fred
may wish to notify her about Alice’s basis choice, but
his only means of conveying this information is through
his limited ability to control the source. After Bob con-
firms receipt of the signals, Fred is permitted to share
further information with Eve by sending it via a classical
or quantum side channel. Apart from this restriction on
their communication, Eve and Fred are free to choose a
common strategy that optimally exploits Fred’s limited
power to manipulate the source and detector.
Various security proofs apply to settings that can be
distinguished by describing Fred’s role. In the setting
considered by Mayers and by Koashi and Preskill, Fred
does not share information with Eve, and the goal of Al-
ice and Bob is to generate a shared key that Eve does
not know. Mayers assumes that the source is perfect,
but Fred is free to choose the measurement performed
by the detector, which can depend at Fred’s discretion
on Bob’s declared basis, and to report to Bob a portion
of the information collected in the measurement. Koashi
and Preskill assume that the detector is perfect, but Fred
is free to choose the states emitted by the source except
for one proviso: the emitted state, averaged over Alice’s
key bit, is independent of Alice’s basis. In the setting
considered in this paper, Eve again applies an arbitrary
basis-independent quantum operation to her probe and
the transmitted signals. And again, Fred, who has infor-
mation about the declared bases, can influence how the
equipment operates. But now, the basis dependence of
Fred’s attack is limited, and Fred and Eve can pool their
knowledge after the signals are detected.
All of these settings are interesting. In the Mayers
model, the detector can be arbitrarily flaky, and in the
Koashi-Preskill model, the source leaks no basis informa-
tion but is otherwise arbitrary. In the model we consider,
both the source and detector are “pretty good” but con-
trolled (within limits) by the adversary. Our models of
the source and the detector will be described in more
detail in Sec. IV.
III. DISTILLATION AND PRIVACY
Our analysis follows the method of proof used by Shor
and Preskill [5], which we will now briefly review. In this
method, security is first established, following [3], for a
protocol based on an entanglement distillation protocol
(EDP). Then the security of a “prepare-and-measure”
protocol, namely BB84, is established through a reduc-
tion to the EDP protocol.
We remark that entanglement distillation was first dis-
cussed in [17], that its relevance to the security of quan-
tum key distribution was emphasized in [18], and that
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this connection was established rigorously in [3]. Entan-
glement distillation protocols have also been called “en-
tanglement purification protocols,” abbreviated EPP.We
prefer to say “distillation” rather than “purification” as
“purification” now has another widely accepted meaning
in quantum information theory.
In the EDP protocol, Alice creates n + m pairs of
qubits, each in the state
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) , (1)
the simultaneous eigenstate with eigenvalue one of the
two commuting operators X ⊗X and Z ⊗ Z, where
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
(2)
are the Pauli operators. Then she sends half of each pair
to Bob. Alice and Bob sacrifice m randomly selected
pairs to test the “error rates” in the X and Z bases by
measuring X ⊗ X and Z ⊗ Z. If the error rate is too
high, they abort the protocol. Otherwise, they conduct
the EDP, extracting k high-fidelity pairs from the n noisy
pairs. Finally, Alice and Bob both measure Z on each of
these pairs, producing a k-bit shared random key about
which Eve has negligible information. The protocol is se-
cure because the EDP removes Eve’s entanglement with
the pairs, leaving her powerless to discern the outcome
of the measurements by Alice and Bob.
If the EDP protocol has special properties, then prov-
ing the security of BB84 can be reduced to proving se-
curity of the EDP. Shor and Preskill considered EDP’s
with one-way communication [19], which are equivalent
to quantum error-correcting codes, and furthermore, con-
sidered the specific class of codes known as Calderbank-
Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [20,21]. (Gottesman and Lo [15]
have described how a similar reduction can be applied to
certain EDP’s with two-way communication.) Like any
quantum error-correcting code, a CSS code can correct
both bit errors (pairs with Z⊗Z = −1) and phase errors
(pairs with X ⊗X = −1). But the crucial property of a
CSS code is that the bit and phase error correction pro-
cedures can be decoupled — Z errors can be corrected
without knowing anything about the X errors and vice-
versa.
In the EDP protocol, the key is affected by the bit
error correction but not by the phase error correction.
The phase error correction is important to expunge en-
tanglement with Eve and so ensure the privacy of the
key. But Eve’s information about the final key is un-
affected if Alice and Bob dispense with the phase error
correction. What is essential is not that the phase error
correction is actually done, but rather that it would have
been successful if it had been done.
With the phase error correction removed, the extrac-
tion of the final key from the n noisy pairs is much
simplified. Rather than first carrying out the EDP and
then measuring Z for each of the k distilled pairs, Alice
and Bob can instead measure Z for each of the n noisy
pairs, and then do classical postprocessing of their mea-
surement results to extract the final key. In this form,
the entanglement-based protocol becomes equivalent to
BB84.
We can see the equivalence more clearly by adding one
further wrinkle to the entanglement-based protocol. In
the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob choose their bases at
random, so that about half of the sifted key bits are trans-
mitted in the X basis and about half in the Z basis. But
in the entanglement-based protocol as we have described
it, all of the final key bits are generated by measuring in
the Z basis. To relate the two protocols, suppose that in
the entanglement-based protocol a subset of the pairs is
selected at random, and that for each pair in this sub-
set, Alice and Bob apply the Hadamard transformation
H : X ↔ Z to their qubits before measuring Z. Equiv-
alently, we can instruct Alice and Bob to measure X
rather than Z for these selected qubits. Each measure-
ment by Alice in the entanglement-based protocol pre-
pares a qubit to be sent to Bob in one of the four BB84
states: X = ±1, Z = ±1, chosen at random. In BB84,
Bob measures either X or Z, and through public discus-
sion Alice and Bob reject the key bits where they used
different bases; the remaining key, for which their bases
agree, is called the “sifted key.” As far as an eavesdropper
is concerned, there is no difference between generating a
bit of sifted key in BB84, where a qubit is prepared by
Alice in a randomly chosen eigenstate of either X or Z
and measured by Bob in the same basis, and generating
a bit of key in the entanglement-based protocol, where
Alice and Bob both measure their halves of an entangled
pair of qubits.
A vestige of the CSS code of the EDP survives as
a scheme for error correction and privacy amplification
in this prepare-and-measure protocol. In a CSS code,
classical linear codes C1 and C
⊥
2 are used for bit and
phase error correction respectively, where C2 ⊂ C1. The
entanglement-based protocol is secure (whether or not
the phase error correction is done) if, with “high probabil-
ity” (probability of success exponentially close to unity),
C1 can correct the bit errors and C
⊥
2 can correct the
phase errors. In the BB84 protocol, C1 is used to correct
bit errors in the key, and C2 to amplify privacy. Specif-
ically, Alice transmits the random string w through the
quantum channel, randomly selects a codeword u of C1,
and announces u+ w. Bob receives the corrupted string
w + e, computes u + e, and corrects to u. The final key
is the coset u+ C2 of C2 in C1.
If this method is used to compute the final key in the
BB84 protocol, and if the key being distributed is very
long, at what asymptotic rate can secure final key be
extracted from the sifted key? The answer is the rate
k/n at which high-fidelity pairs can be distilled from
noisy pairs in the EDP, which depends on how noisy
the pairs are. The purpose of the verification test in-
cluded in the protocol is to obtain a reliable estimate
of the noise. In the EDP, a useful way to characterize
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the noise is to imagine that, after the final Hadamard
transformations are applied to the pairs, all n pairs are
measured in the Bell basis — that is, both Z ⊗ Z and
X ⊗ X are measured. If there were no noise at all, we
would find Z ⊗ Z = X ⊗X = 1 for every pair. Denote
by nδ˜ the number of pairs for which we have Z⊗Z = −1
instead; we say that δ˜ is the bit error rate of the noisy
pairs. Denote by nδ˜p the number of pairs for which we
have X ⊗X = −1; we say that δ˜p is the phase error rate
of the pairs.
For a given state of the n pairs, the rates δ˜ and δ˜p are
actually random variables, because the quantum mea-
surement of the pairs is nondeterministic. But suppose
that from the verification test, we can infer that for suf-
ficiently large n and any ε > 0, the inequalities δ˜ < δ+ ε
and δ˜p < δp + ε are satisfied with high probability. Fur-
thermore, we may imagine that the key bits are subjected
in the protocol to a publicly announced random permu-
tation (or equivalently that the CSS code is correspond-
ingly randomized), so that the bit and phase errors are
randomly distributed among the qubits. It can then be
shown [22,23] that, for sufficiently large n and any ε′ > 0,
there exists a CSS code such that the EDP distills k high-
fidelity pairs from the n noisy pairs, where
k/n > 1−H2(δ + ε+ ε′)−H2(δp + ε+ ε′) , (3)
and H2(δ) = −δ log2 δ − (1 − δ) log2(1 − δ) is the bi-
nary entropy function. Therefore, in BB84, we establish
an asymptotically achievable rate of extraction of secure
final key from sifted key (“key generation rate”):
R = 1−H2(δ) −H2(δp) , (4)
That is, in the BB84 protocol, a fraction H2(δ) of the
sifted key bits are sacrificed asymptotically to perform
error correction and a fraction H2(δp) of the sifted key
bits are sacrificed to perform privacy amplification.
We note that, although the permutation randomizes
the positions of both the bit errors and the phase er-
rors, correlations between bit errors and phase errors
may remain. However, these correlations do not affect
the achievable rate, because with CSS codes the bit er-
ror correction and phase error correction are performed
separately. We also remark that the code C1 used to cor-
rect bit errors can be chosen to be efficiently decodable
[24]. It may not be possible to simultaneously choose the
code C⊥2 to be efficiently decodable, but this is not im-
portant, since the phase error correction using C⊥2 is not
actually carried out in the BB84 protocol — it need only
be possible in principle.
Our arguments so far have reduced the problem of
demonstrating the security of BB84 to inferring suffi-
ciently stringent upper bounds on both the bit error rate
and the phase error rate of the pairs used to generate
the key in the corresponding entanglement-based proto-
col, based on the results of the verification test. Inferring
the upper bound on the bit error rate is straightforward.
Let us consider the version of the entanglement-based
protocol in which Alice and Bob measure both the test
pairs and the key generating pairs in the Z basis, but
a Hadamard transformation is applied to randomly se-
lected pairs just prior to the measurement. When Eve
interacts with the qubits traveling from Alice to Bob,
she has no a priori knowledge concerning which pairs
will be used for the test and which will be used for key
generation. Therefore, the test pairs are a fair sample;
it follows from classical sampling theory that the joint
probability of observing nδ errors in the test set and more
than n(δ + ε) errors in the key set is exponentially small
for any ε > 0 and n sufficiently large. Note that this
argument works even if Eve’s attack induces strong cor-
relations among the pairs; all that is required is that the
sample selected for the test is chosen randomly.
Inferring an upper bound on the phase error rate re-
quires an extra step. In the Shor-Preskill argument, it
is assumed that the adversary has no a priori knowledge
about the basis that Alice uses to send her signals and
Bob uses to detect them. In the entanglement-based pro-
tocol, this becomes the statement that the adversary does
not know to which pairs the Hadamard transformation
is applied. But since the Hadamard interchanges the bit
errors and the phase errors, it enforces a symmetry be-
tween the two types of errors. Therefore, the error rate
measured in the test serves as an estimate of the phase
error rate as well as the bit error rate: with high proba-
bility the phase error rate of the key generating pairs is
also less than δ + ε. We conclude that final key can be
extracted from sifted key at the rate R = 1− 2H2(δ).
Now we have sketched the complete proof of security of
BB84, except for one technicality. The sampling theory
argument actually shows that the joint probability of a
error rate δ in the test pairs and an error greater than
δ + ε for the key generating pairs is exponentially small.
For a security analysis, we should show that the condi-
tional probability of an error rate for the key generating
pairs greater than δ+ ε is exponentially small, given the
error rate δ found in the test. The desired result follows
from Bayes’s theorem as long as we assume that Eve’s
attack “passes” the verification test with a probability
that is not itself exponentially small. That is, we exclude
strategies by Eve such that extraordinary luck is required
to induce the (small) error rate δ found in the test. With
this caveat in mind, we propose this definition of security:
Definition. Security of quantum key distribution.
A quantum key distribution protocol is secure if for any
attack by Eve that passes the verification test with a prob-
ability that is not exponentially small, with high probabil-
ity Alice and Bob agree on a final key that is nearly uni-
formly distributed and Eve’s information about the final
key is exponentially small. Here “exponentially small”
means bounded above by e−CN where N is the number
of signals transmitted in the protocol and C is a positive
constant, “high probability” means exponentially close to
1, and “nearly uniformly distributed” means with a prob-
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ability distribution exponentially close to the uniform dis-
tribution.
And we conclude:
Theorem 1. Security of BB84 against basis-
independent attacks. The BB84 protocol is secure if
Eve launches a basis-independent attack. Secure final key
can be extracted from sifted key at the asymptotic rate
R = Max
(
1− 2H2(δ), 0
)
(5)
where δ is the bit error rate found in the verification test
(assuming δ < 1/2).
To reiterate, two error rates are relevant to whether
quantum key distribution is successful. The bit error
rate is “measured” by conducting a verification test on a
randomly sampled subset of the sifted key bits; that is,
the observed bit error rate δ found in the test provides
an estimate of the error rate δ˜ in the key generating bits
that is accurate with high probability. If δ is low enough,
we can be confident that error correction will succeed, so
that Alice and Bob share a common key. The phase error
rate δ˜p is not measured by direct sampling — rather an
upper bound δ˜p < δp + ε is inferred from the bit error
rate. If the inferred phase error rate δp is low enough,
we can be confident that phase error correction (if done)
will succeed, so that Eve will have a negligible amount of
information about the key.
If the adversary has no knowledge of the basis, then
with high probability the gap |δ˜p − δ˜| between the bit
and phase error rates is asymptotically negligible, and
the inference is straightforward. For example, if the ef-
fect of Eve’s attack is to apply X to Bob’s qubit, this
action will induce a bit error if Alice and Bob both mea-
sure Z to generate a key bit in the entanglement-based
protocol, and it will induce a phase error if Alice and
Bob both measure X . Since Eve doesn’t know the basis,
her action generates bit errors and phase errors with the
same probability. But in this paper, going beyond Shor’s
and Preskill’s original argument, we will allow Fred to
know the basis, enabling him to enhance δ˜p relative to δ˜.
In many cases of interest, the basis dependence of Fred’s
attack is limited; we can infer an upper bound δ˜p < δp+ε
and so through Eq. (4) establish an achievable key length.
In the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob can measure both
the error rate δX when they use the X basis and the er-
ror rate δZ when they use the Z basis. These rates need
not be equal even if Eve does not know the bases that
Alice and Bob use. For example, Eve might measure in
the Z basis each qubit she receives from Alice, and re-
send to Bob the Z eigenstate found by her measurement,
resulting in expected values δZ = 0 and δX = 1/2. We
emphasize that δ and δp should not be confused with δZ
and δX . The bit error rate δ ≈ (δX + δZ) /2 is observed
in the verification test, but the phase error rate δp is not
directly “measured” in the protocol.1
IV. MODEL DEVICES
Because the Shor-Preskill argument, both in its orig-
inal incarnation and in its extension to basis-dependent
attacks, makes use of an EDP, there are limitations on
the sources and detectors to which it applies. In the
entanglement-based protocol, Alice and Bob both mea-
sure qubits, in either the X basis or the Z basis — what
we will call standard measurements. In the correspond-
ing prepare and measure protocol, Alice’s source need not
emit a qubit, but whatever it emits can be simulated by
a standard measurement performed on half of a bipartite
state [22]. The state that arrives at Bob’s detector also
might not be a qubit, but the measurement can be real-
ized as a standard measurement preceded by an operation
that “squashes” the incoming state to a two-dimensional
Hilbert space.
To be more specific, the source model that we adopt is
as follows: Alice’s source emits a state in a Hilbert space
A, where A can be arbitrary, and she launches a state
by acting on an auxiliary qubit A′. Alice’s basis choice
a ∈ {0, 1} is determined by flipping a coin. Then a state
ρa of HA ⊗ HA′ , which can depend on the basis a, is
prepared by Fred. Alice proceeds to perform a standard
measurement on her qubit A′ in the basis indicated by a;
that is, a Hadamard transformation is performed on A′
if and only if a = 1, and then Alice measures the qubit
in the Z basis. Her measurement determines her key bit:
g = 0 for outcome +1, g = 1 for outcome −1. (Note
that, depending on the state ρa, the key bits g = 0, 1
need not be equiprobable.) If Fred’s states ρ0 and ρ1
are close to one another, then the states emitted by the
source, averaged over the key bit, depend only weakly on
the basis.
Actually we can generalize this source model to allow
successive emissions to be correlated with one another.
Now let A′ denote a system of n qubits, A the system in
which Alice’s n signals reside, and ρa a state ofHA⊗HA′ ;
the state ρa may depend on the n-bit string a that spec-
ifies Alice’s basis choice for each of the n signals. Alice
applies a Hadamard transformation to the ith qubit if
and only if ai = 1, then measures the qubits in the Z ba-
sis. The measurement outcomes determine her n-bit key
g. Some of the results we report in this paper (Theorem
2, for example) apply to this more general source model.
1If Alice and Bob perform a refined error analysis [25] (measuring separate error rates for the two bases), they can improve
the key generation rate to R = 1−H2(δZ)−H2(δX) [23].
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FIG. 1. Roles of Alice, Bob, Eve, and Fred in the key
distribution protocol. Fred prepares an entangled state ρa
(which may depend slightly on Alice’s basis choice a) of Al-
ice’s n-qubit Hilbert space A′ and the signal space A; then
Alice triggers the source by performing a standard measure-
ment on A′. Eve applies an arbitrary basis-independent at-
tack, and then Fred applies a channel Eb (which may depend
slightly on Bob’s basis choice b) that “squashes” the signals
from the Hilbert space B to the n-qubit space B′. Finally,
the qubits in B′ are subjected to a standard measurement by
Bob. The goal of the protocol is to generate a key that is not
known by Eve and Fred, who may communicate freely after
Bob measures.
The n signals emitted by the source are attacked by
Eve, who sends to the detector a state that lives in a
Hilbert space HB . We model the detector as follows:
Bob’s basis choice b ∈ {0, 1}⊗n for the n signals is de-
termined by flipping n coins. Then Fred applies to the
state received by the detector a quantum channel Eb that
“squashes”HB to the n-qubit space HB′ ; this squash op-
eration may depend on the basis b. Bob proceeds to per-
form standard measurements on the qubits; a Hadamard
is performed on the ith qubit if and only if bi = 1, then
Bob measures the qubits in the Z basis. The measure-
ments determine his n-bit key h : hi = 0 if the outcome
of the measurement of the ith qubit is +1 and hi = 1
for outcome −1. Since the channel taking HB to HB′
can act collectively on the incoming signals, our model
allows the detector to perform a collective measurement
on the n signals it receives. The basis-dependence in the
detector’s performance is encoded in Fred’s channel Eb.
The prepare-and-measure BB84 protocol, for the
source and detector models we have described, is depicted
in Fig. 1. It can be related to a protocol in which entan-
gled pairs of qubits are prepared by Eve (with help from
Fred). Half of each pair is delivered to Alice, half to
Bob, and they then proceed to perform standard mea-
surements. The security of this latter protocol follows
from the security of the corresponding EDP. Therefore,
for this model of source and detector, we can use the
Shor-Preskill method to analyze the security of BB84.
It may be instructive to contrast our models of the
source and detector with those considered in the proofs
of Mayers [2] and Koashi and Preskill [6]. Mayers allows
the detector to perform an arbitrary two-outcome POVM
on each signal it receives, while in our model the POVM
must be one that can be realized by a squash followed by
a standard measurement. In principle, our model entails
no loss of generality, since the Mayers POVM could be
followed by the preparation of a qubit in a state chosen so
that the standard measurement will reproduce the out-
come of the POVM. However, our security proof works
only if the channel Eb applied by Fred depends sufficiently
weakly on the basis b, while Mayers requires no such
condition. Koashi and Preskill consider a source that
can be realized by the preparation of a basis-independent
state of an bipartite system, followed by an arbitrary
two-outcome POVM on half of the system, while in our
model the POVM must be a standard measurement of
a qubit. For the signals emitted by a general Koashi-
Preskill source, though it would be possible to launch
the same signals by performing a standard measurement
on a qubit, this can be done only by choosing bipartite
states that depend strongly on the basis, and our security
proof works only when the dependence of the states on
the basis is sufficiently weak. Therefore, our analysis of
security does not apply to the general Mayers detector or
the general Koashi-Preskill source. On the other hand,
Mayers does not allow Fred to attack the source, Koashi
and Preskill do not allow Fred to attack the detector, and
the signals emitted by the Koashi-Preskill source reveal
no information about the basis used. In contrast, our
model allows the performance of both the source and the
detector to depend on the basis, and allows the source to
leak some information about the basis.
Another noteworthy difference between our model and
those of Mayers and Koashi-Preskill is that our model
allows Alice’s source to emit successive signals that are
entangled with one another, and allows the detector to
measure the signals collectively. In contrast, Koashi and
Preskill assume that the signals emitted by Alice’s source
are unentangled with one another, and Mayers likewise
assumes that the signals are detected by Bob individu-
ally rather than collectively. This assumption is used be-
cause a crucial step in the Mayers proof is to show that
Eve’s information about Alice’s key would be unchanged
if Bob were to flip the basis in which he measures the
key bits, but not the basis in which he measures the test
bits. A general collective measurement of the signals by
Bob would generate correlations between key bit mea-
surements and test bit measurements; therefore, when
Bob announces the outcome of his measurements of the
test bits he might reveal to Eve some information about
his choice of basis for the measurement of the key bits.
For this reason, we do not know how to justify the in-
variance of Eve’s information under the basis flip in the
case of a collective measurement (though it is not in-
conceivable that the argument can be extended to cover
that case). Similarly, the Koashi–Preskill proof uses the
property that Eve’s information about Bob’s key would
be unchanged if Alice were to flip the basis in which she
sends the key bits but not the basis in which she sends the
test bits, which cannot be justified unless Alice’s signals
are unentangled.
Our model of the detector can easily be generalized by
endowing the detector with imperfect efficiency, so that
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it sometimes misfires and fails to record an outcome. One
simple modification attaches an additional flag bit di to
each of Bob’s qubits. If di = 0, then the ith qubit is
measured as above, but if di = 1 then the ith qubit is
discarded and no outcome is recorded.
Detector inefficiencies and other types of losses can
be incorporated into the Shor-Preskill security analysis
easily enough. Through public discussion, Alice and
Bob can eliminate from their sifted key all signals for
which Bob failed to record a measurement result. In the
entanglement-based protocol, then, we consider an EDP
applied to all the pairs from which sifted key bits will be
successfully extracted when the measurements are per-
formed. That is, before the EDP is applied we discard
all pairs for which Alice and Bob chose different bases or
for which the detector misfired, as well as the pairs con-
sumed by the verification test. Security is then proven if
we can infer from the test that, with high probability, the
remaining pairs have sufficiently low rates of bit errors
and phase errors. However, this inference must take into
account any basis dependence in the detector efficiency
that might contribute to the gap between δ˜ and δ˜p, as
we will discuss further in Sec. XIII. Basis-dependent de-
tector inefficiencies are more problematic for the Mayers
argument, since the basis dependence may spoil the in-
variance of Eve’s information about Alice’s key when Bob
flips his basis for the key bits (but not the test bits).
V. REAL DEVICES
We are interested in analyzing the security of quan-
tum key distribution with imperfect equipment because
we seek assurance that our protocols are secure not just
in an ideal world but also in the real world. Therefore,
the inherent limitations of our source and detector mod-
els should be soberly contemplated.
For example, real sources typically emit not qubits but
bosonic modes of the electromagnetic field, and if the
likelihood that a mode is multiply occupied is too high,
security may be compromised. To evaluate this security
threat in our limited framework, we will need to adjust
our source model (as we will discuss in Sec. XII) to incor-
porate the relevant features, even if not all the detailed
physics, of the real source.
A similar comment applies to detectors. In a typical
detector setup for BB84, the incoming photonic mode en-
counters a polarizing beam splitter that routes the Z = 1
and Z = −1 polarization states (or theX = ±1 states) to
two different photon detectors — threshold detectors that
do not distinguish one photon from many. If one or the
other detector fires, the polarization state is identified.
But if more than one photon is present, both detectors
might fire, an ambiguous result. If Bob is equipped with
such a detector, Eve can trigger the ambiguous result at
will by flooding the detector with photons. Even more
troubling, Eve can arrange that Bob receive the ambigu-
ous result if he chooses one basis but not the other. For
example, Eve can intercept and measure in the Z ba-
sis the signal emitted by Alice, and then send on to Bob
many Z-polarized photons in the state she detects. Then
Bob will reproduce Eve’s result if he measures in the Z
basis, but will obtain the ambiguous result if he mea-
sures in the X basis [27]. Thus, by exploiting the flaw
in the design of the detector, Eve can launch a “Trojan
horse” attack, in effect switching Bob’s detector off when
it is poised to detect eavesdropping [28]. Although our
detector model may not fully incorporate all the physics
of the polarization beam splitter, we will nonetheless be
able to investigate in Sec. XIII the power of a Trojan
horse attack within an EDP framework.
VI. CHOOSING THE BASIS QUANTUMLY
For a security analysis that is applicable to BB84 per-
formed with imperfect equipment, we wish to bound the
adversary’s information in the case of an attack that de-
pends weakly on the basis used to send and detect the
signals. For this purpose, we should find a precise for-
mulation of what it means for the basis dependence to
be “weak.” Therefore, let us focus attention on the coins
that Alice and Bob flip to determine their random choices
of basis. An attack that depends weakly on the basis is
one that depends only slightly on the outcomes of the
coin flips.
In the entanglement-based protocol as we have de-
scribed it up to now, the coin flip is treated classi-
cally, and the outcome of the flip determines whether
a Hadamard transformation is applied to a qubit before
it is measured in the Z basis. Denote by ai ∈ {0, 1}
the outcome of the flip of the ith coin and by the length
n string a the outcome of the flip of n coins. (In the
BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob flip separate coins. But
for our security analysis we may confine our attention to
the sifted key, for which their coin flips agree; therefore
in effect there is only one basis choice ai for each signal.)
Denote by H(a) the operation which applies a Hadamard
to the ith qubit if ai = 1 and the identity to the ith qubit
if ai = 0. Then in the setting where Eve knows nothing
about the basis choice, the effect of the randomly applied
Hadamards by Alice and Bob (after the attack by Eve)
is to transform the state of the n pairs according to
ρ→ ρ′ = 1
2n
2n−1∑
a=0
(H(a)⊗H(a)) ρ (H(a)⊗H(a)) . (6)
Then since H(b)H(a) = H(a⊕ b), ρ′ has the property of
Hadamard invariance: for any bit string b,
(H(b)⊗H(b)) ρ′ (H(b)⊗H(b)) = ρ′ . (7)
In the Shor-Preskill argument, this symmetry of ρ′ is used
to infer that the bit error rate and phase error rate of the
key generating pairs are, with high probability, nearly
the same.
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In order to analyze (weakly) basis-dependent attacks,
it is convenient to treat the coin flip quantumly rather
than classically — we can imagine that each coin is in a
coherent superposition of heads and tails, and that the
Hadamard transform is conditioned on the state of the
coins. In the ideal protocol, the n coins are prepared in
the state
(
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
)⊗n
=
1√
2n
2n−1∑
a=0
|a〉 , (8)
and the Hadamard is applied to the ith pair if ai = 1 —
therefore, if |Ψ〉 is the state of the pairs, then the effect
of the random basis choice can be expressed as
|Ψ〉 ⊗ |a〉 → (H(a)⊗H(a)) |Ψ〉 ⊗ |a〉 . (9)
When we trace over the state of the coin, the effect on
the quantum state of the pairs is just as in eq. (6).
Now, in this formulation, it is easy to describe the
distinction between Eve’s basis-independent attack and
Fred’s basis-dependent attack. Eve interacts only with
the pairs, but Fred is permitted to tamper with both the
pairs and the coins, as in Fig. 2. In the actual proto-
col, the coin is classical, but it will not make Fred any
less powerful if we allow him to attack a quantum coin
instead. (When we say that the coin is “classical,” we
mean Fred’s attack is a quantum operation applied to
the pairs that is conditioned on the state of the coin in a
preferred basis. We will prove security for general attacks
by Fred with weak dependence on the state of the coin,
so our results will apply in particular to the case of a
classical coin.) Furthermore, it is easy to state precisely
what it means for the attack to depend only weakly on
the basis: the basis dependence is weak if Fred’s attack
disturbs the coin only slightly. This notion of weak basis
dependence applies even if we allow Fred to attack the
signals twice, at the source (before Eve’s attack) and at
the detector (after Eve’s attack). Actually, once we intro-
duce the quantum coin in this way, it is not so important
to keep Fred in the picture at all — we can go back to
the usual picture in which there is only one adversary,
but limit Eve’s attack on the coin.
Definition. ∆-balanced attack. Suppose that after
n pairs and the n corresponding coins are attacked by
the adversary (but before the final Hadamard transfor-
mations, conditioned on the coins, that precede the mea-
surement of the pairs in the Z basis), the n coins are all
measured in the X basis. The attack is ∆-balanced if,
with high probability, the number of coins for which the
measurement outcome is X = −1 is less than n∆.
If ∆ ≈ 0, the attack is balanced — that is, basis-
independent. We will prove in Sec. VII that if the at-
tack is ∆-balanced and ∆ is sufficiently small, then se-
cure quantum key distribution is possible, and we will
obtain a lower bound on the achievable key generation
rate. Later we will discuss some more specific examples
of ∆-balanced attacks, and for some of those attacks we
will obtain stronger lower bounds on the rate.
Fred
H

 s
Measure Z
Measure Z
Measure X
coin
signal
FIG. 2. The quantum coin. The basis choice for the detec-
tor (and the source) is determined by measuring a qubit (the
coin) in the Z basis. To generate each bit of sifted key, a con-
ditional Hadamard transformation, controlled by the coin, is
applied to the signal qubit, and then the signal qubit is mea-
sured in the Z basis. Fred’s basis-dependent attack on the
signal can be described as a joint attack on the coin and the
signal. To quantify how the coin is disturbed by Fred’s at-
tack, we consider measuring the coin in the X basis after the
attack and before the conditional Hadamard.
We emphasize again that for a security analysis it suf-
fices to imagine that Alice and Bob share a single quan-
tum coin that determines the choice of basis for each
signal. Of course, in the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob
use separate classical coins to determine whether to use
the Z basis or the X basis. But the quantum coin is
not intended to provide an accurate portrayal of the ac-
tual protocol; it is a mathematical device for analyzing
the impact of the basis dependence of the attack. For the
purpose of this analysis, we replace the two classical coins
by a single quantum coin only after discarding the cases
in which Alice’s classical coin flip and Bob’s classical coin
flip yield different outcomes.
We have seen that for the analysis of the BB84 pro-
tocol, it is convenient to imagine that Alice delays the
measurement that launches her signals until after Eve’s
attack. That way, we can relate the classical privacy am-
plification in BB84 to an EDP, and so establish security.
Here we are taking this idea a step further. It is conve-
nient to imagine that the measurement of the coin that
determines the basis is also delayed until after the attack
by Eve and Fred. That way, we can infer a bound on the
asymmetry between the bit error rate and the phase er-
ror rate for pairs subjected to the EDP, and so establish
that the EDP will be effective.
VII. SECURITY PROOF FOR SMALL
BASIS-DEPENDENT FLAWS
To analyze security, we’d like to relate the asymmetry
of the coin (as parametrized by ∆) to the gap between
the bit error rate δ˜ and the phase error rate δ˜p when the
pairs are measured in the Bell basis. First we need to
write down a convenient expression for this gap.
In the entanglement-based protocol, the random vari-
ables nδ˜ and nδ˜p are defined as the number of bit errors
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and phase errors that would be found if the n key gen-
erating pairs were all measured in the Bell basis. For a
particular pair, consider the observable
1
2
(Z ⊗ Z −X ⊗X) = |φ−〉〈φ−| − |ψ+〉〈ψ+| , (10)
where |φ−〉 and |ψ+〉 are the Bell states
|φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) ,
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) . (11)
This observable has eigenvalues {+1, 0,−1}. If the pair
is to be measured in the Z basis, we say that there is
a bit error if Z ⊗ Z = −1 and that there is a phase
error if X ⊗ X = −1. Therefore, the eigenvalue of
1
2 (Z⊗Z−X⊗X) is −1 if there is a bit error but no phase
error, +1 if there is a phase error but no bit error, and
0 if either there are no errors or both a bit error and a
phase error. Similarly, if the pair is to be measured in the
X basis, we say that there is a phase error if Z⊗Z = −1
and that there is a bit error if X ⊗X = −1. Therefore,
the eigenvalue of 12 (Z⊗Z−X⊗X) is +1 if there is a bit
error but no phase error, −1 if there is a phase error but
no bit error, and 0 if either there are no errors or both a
bit error and a phase error.
Suppose that the basis choice is decided by flipping a
coin, where the pairs are to be measured in the Z basis
if the outcome of the coin flip is |0〉 (Zcoin = 1), and the
pairs are to be measured in the X basis if the outcome
of the coin flip is |1〉 (Zcoin = −1). Then the observable
1
2
(Z ⊗ Z −X ⊗X)pair ⊗ Zcoin (12)
has the eigenvalue −1 if the pair has a bit error but no
phase error, the eigenvalue +1 if the pair has a phase er-
ror but no bit error, and the eigenvalue 0 otherwise. We
see, then, that for the n key generating pairs, the gap
between the number of phase errors and the number of
bit errors can be expressed as
ngap ≡ n
(
δ˜p − δ˜
)
=
n∑
i=1
1
2
(Z ⊗ Z −X ⊗X)pair,i ⊗ Zcoin,i . (13)
Eq. (13) means that ngap is a random variable whose
probability distribution is the distribution of outcomes if
the observable on the right-hand side of eq. (13) is mea-
sured. We might imagine that Z ⊗ Z and X ⊗ X are
measured for every pair (this is a complete Bell measure-
ment) and that Zcoin is measured for every coin; then
ngap is found by summing up all the results of these
measurements. But since the Bell measurements and the
coin measurements all commute with our expression for
ngap in eq. (13), we could just as well imagine that ngap
is measured first, and that the other measurements are
completed later — the probability distribution for ngap
will be the same either way. In any case, our expres-
sion for ngap is valid even if there are strong correlations
among the pairs and the coins.
If we imagine that all of the coins are measured in the
X basis (as in the definition of a ∆-balanced attack),
then the random variable that represents the number of
coins for which the outcome is X = −1 can be expressed
as
n
(X)
coin =
n∑
i=1
(I ⊗ I)pair,i ⊗
1
2
(I −X)coin,i . (14)
We wish to obtain a bound on ngap that will hold with
high probability for any possible state of the pairs and
the coins such that n
(X)
coin is less than n∆ with high prob-
ability. It is convenient to express the gap as a sum of
two terms, ngap = n
(Z)
gap + n
(X)
gap , and to bound each term
separately. First, consider
n(Z)gap =
1
2
n∑
i=1
(Z ⊗ Z)pair,i ⊗ Zcoin,i . (15)
For each value of i, imagine that we perform two succes-
sive controlled-NOT gates, one with Alice’s qubit as the
control and the coin as the target, and the other with
Bob’s qubit as the control and the coin as the target.
Acting by conjugation, the effect of these gates is
(Z ⊗ Z)pair ⊗ Zcoin → (I ⊗ I)pair ⊗ Zcoin ,
(I ⊗ I)pair ⊗Xcoin → (I ⊗ I)pair ⊗Xcoin . (16)
Therefore, this change of basis has no effect on the statis-
tics of the observable n
(X)
coin, while transforming the ob-
servable n
(Z)
gap according to
n(Z)gap →
n
2
− n(Z)coin , (17)
where
n
(Z)
coin =
n∑
i=1
(I ⊗ I)pair,i ⊗
1
2
(I − Z)coin,i (18)
(the number of coins for which Z = −1, if all n are mea-
sured in the Z basis).
We are interested in analyzing how the statistics of
n
(Z)
gap is related to the statistics of n
(X)
coin. Let ρ denote the
state of the n coins and the n pairs, and suppose that
the controlled-NOT gates described above transform this
state to a new state ρ′. We see that the statistics of n
(X)
coin
and n
(Z)
gap in the state ρ is identical to the statistics of
n
(X)
coin and
n
2 − n
(Z)
coin in the state ρ
′. Therefore, to derive
a relation between n
(X)
coin and n
(Z)
gap that holds with high
probability for an arbitrary state ρ, it suffices to analyze
how n
(Z)
coin and n
(X)
coin are related for an arbitrary state ρ
′.
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For this we appeal to the following lemma, which asserts
that if n
(X)
coin is small, then n
(Z)
coin is close to n/2:
Lemma 1 For a quantum state of n coins, suppose that
with high probability n
(X)
coin < n∆. Then, for any positive
ε, with high probability
|n/2− n(Z)coin| < n(f(∆) + ε) , (19)
where ∆ and f(∆) are related by
H2(1/2− f(∆)) +H2(∆) = 1 . (20)
Proof: The proof for the case of a pure quantum state
|ψ〉 of n coins, where n(X) < n∆ with probability 1, is in
Appendix A of [26]. But if instead n(X) < n∆ with high
probability, we can write |ψ〉 = |ψ〉good + |ψ〉bad, where
the (unnormalized) state |ψ〉good has n(X) < n∆ with
probability 1, and ‖ ψbad ‖ is exponentially small. Hence
|ψ〉good, and therefore also |ψ〉, has the property eq. (19)
with high probability. Therefore, Lemma 1 holds for pure
states. Now, a mixed state can be realized as an ensemble
of pure states. By the hypothesis of Lemma 1, all of the
pure states in this ensemble, except for those occuring
with exponentially small probability, satisfy n(X) < n∆
with high probability, and therefore also satisfy eq. (19)
with high probability. This proves Lemma 1.
We note that by expanding H2(1/2 − f) as a power
series in f , and using the convexity of H2, we can derive
from eq. (20) a useful inequality satisfied by f(∆):
(
f(∆)
)2 ≤ 1
2
(ln 2)H2(∆) . (21)
Expanding this expression for small ∆ and using convex-
ity again, we obtain
f(∆) ≤
√
∆
2
ln
( e
∆
)
. (22)
From Lemma 1 and eq. (17), we infer that, for a ∆-
balanced attack, |n(Z)gap| < n(f(∆) + ε) with high prob-
ability. A similar argument shows that also |n(X)gap | <
n(f(∆) + ε) with high probability, where
n(X)gap = −
1
2
n∑
i=1
(X ⊗X)pairs,i ⊗ Zcoin,i . (23)
(For this argument, we apply Hadamard transformations
to all pairs before applying the CNOT gates.) Since
ngap = n
(Z)
gap + n
(X)
gap , we have proved:
Lemma 2 For a ∆-balanced attack on n pairs and n
coins, the state of the pairs has the property
|δ˜p − δ˜| < 2(f(∆) + ε) (24)
with high probability, for any positive ε.
With Lemma 2 in hand, we can now complete the
proof of security following the steps outlined in Sec. III.
If the error rate found in the test is δ, then the num-
ber of bit errors in the key-generating pairs is less than
n(δ + ε) with high probability (assuming that Eve’s at-
tack passes the test with a probability that is not expo-
nentially small). For a ∆-balanced attack, we infer that
the number of phase errors in the key-generating pairs
is less than n(δ + 2f(∆) + ε) with high probability. By
introducing a random permutation (not known by Eve
or Fred) we can ensure that the errors are randomly dis-
tributed among the pairs. Therefore, for a suitable CSS
code, high fidelity pairs (and hence secure key) can be
extracted at a rate 1 −H2(δ + ε) −H2(δ + 2f(∆) + ε),
for any positive ε. We have proved:
Theorem 2. Security of BB84 against weakly
basis-dependent attacks. The BB84 protocol is secure
if Eve and Fred launch a ∆-balanced attack. Secure final
key can be extracted from sifted key at the asymptotic rate
R = Max
(
1−H2(δ)−H2(δ + 2f(∆)), 0
)
(25)
where δ is the bit error rate found in the verification
test and f(∆) is defined as in eq. (20). (We assume
δ + 2f(∆) < 1/2.)
We note that the key generation rate found in Theorem
2 is nonzero only for 2f(∆) < 1/2, or ∆ < .0289.
Theorem 2 is our central result concerning security for
equipment with generic flaws. In the remainder of this
paper, we will analyze some specific examples. As we
will see, for some special cases we can establish a key
generation rate exceeding the rate eq. (25) found for the
general case.
VIII. INDIVIDUAL SOURCE FLAWS AND A
PERFECT DETECTOR
As our first application of Theorem 2, we consider the
case where the detector is perfect, but the source is sub-
ject to individual flaws that may leak some information
to Eve about Alice’s basis choice. We will prove security
by showing that the attack is ∆-balanced.
Suppose that Alice’s source emits one of four possible
states of a single qubit. In the ideal protocol, these states
are the four BB84 states, chosen equiprobably. Suppose,
though, that the source is imperfect, so that the four
states differ from the corresponding BB84 states, but
only slightly.
Let a ∈ {0, 1} denote Alice’s declared basis choice (ide-
ally, the Z basis for a = 0 and the X basis for a = 1)
and let g ∈ {0, 1} denote Alice’s key bit. Suppose that
a and g are chosen with the joint probability pa,g, and
that once the values of a and g are chosen, Alice’s source
emits a state ρa,g. The Koashi-Preskill analysis applies if
p0,0ρ0,0 + p0,1ρ0,1 = p1,0ρ1,0 + p1,1ρ1,1, the case in which
the source does not reveal any information about a. We
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will say that the source is oblivious when it has this prop-
erty. Now we are interested in the case were the source
is nonoblivious — it leaks a small amount of information
about the basis choice.
We can characterize the flawed source by imagining
that Alice prepares her states by performing an ideal
measurement on half of an entangled pair. The state
of the pair (prior to Alice’s measurement) is ρ0 for a = 0
and ρ1 for a = 1. The basis-dependence of the source is
weak in the sense that the states ρ0 and ρ1 differ only
slightly — their fidelity is close to one:√
F (ρ0, ρ1) ≡ ‖ √ρ0√ρ1 ‖tr > 1− 2εs . (26)
If n signals are sent, the state that Fred prepares is
a product state:
⊗n
i=1 ρ
(i)
ai , where ai denotes the basis
choice for the ith signal, and
√
F (ρ
(i)
0 , ρ
(i)
1 ) > 1− 2εs for
each i. Thus we say that Fred’s attack on the source is
individual, and that the basis-dependence is character-
ized by εs. We will suppose for now that any flaws in the
detector are basis independent, so that Fred attacks only
the source.
The states ρ0 and ρ1 may be mixed in general, but
they can be “purified” by introducing a suitable “envi-
ronment” E; that is, there are pure states |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉
such that
trE
(|Ψ0〉〈Ψ0|) = ρ0 , trE(|Ψ1〉〈Ψ1|) = ρ1 . (27)
Furthermore, it follows from eq. (26) that the purifica-
tions can be chosen to have a large overlap [29,30]:
Re 〈Ψ1|Ψ0〉 > 1− 2εs . (28)
Now suppose that, as in Sec. VI, we imagine that the
basis choice is determined by a “quantum coin.” Then,
the state of the coin, the pair, and the environment can
be described as a pure state
1√
2
(|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |0〉+ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |1〉) . (29)
If the state of the pair used by Alice to prepare her signal
depends on the choice of basis, then the coin will be en-
tangled with the pair and environment, and the strength
of this entanglement will depend on how much |Ψ0〉 and
|Ψ1〉 differ. Of course, the quantum coin is merely a
mathematical fiction that we invoke for the purpose of
analyzing the basis dependence of the pairs that are used
to generate the key in the entanglement-based key dis-
tribution protocol. Furthermore, the state of the pairs
does not depend on how we choose the purifications of
ρ0 and ρ1. But the state of the coins does depend on this
choice, and we may exploit our freedom in choosing the
purifications to obtain the strongest possible bound on
the basis dependence of the pairs.
Since we are assuming that any flaws in the detec-
tor are basis independent, these may be absorbed into
Eve’s basis-independent attack. Then since Eve’s attack
has no effect on the coins, the state of any coin can be
completely characterized by tracing out the pair and en-
vironment from eq. (29). If the state of the coin is now
measured in the X basis, the outcome X = −1 occurs
with probability
p =
1
4
‖ |Ψ0〉 − |Ψ1〉 ‖2
=
1
2
(
1− Re 〈Ψ1|Ψ0〉
)
< εs . (30)
Because the attack is individual, the coins are indepen-
dent and this bound on p applies to each one of the n
coins; therefore we conclude that the attack is (εs + ε)-
balanced, for any positive ε. Hence from Theorem 2 we
obtain
Theorem 3. Security of BB84 for a source with
individual weakly basis-dependent flaws. Suppose
that the flaws in the detector are basis-independent, and
that the flaws in the source are individual. The ith signal
sent by Alice is prepared by performing a standard qubit
measurement on half of an entangled state — this state
is ρ
(i)
0 when the Z basis is declared and ρ
(i)
1 when the X
basis is declared, where
√
F (ρ
(i)
0 , ρ
(i)
1 ) > 1 − 2εs for all
i. Then the BB84 protocol is secure, and secure final key
can be extracted from sifted key at the asymptotic rate
R = Max (1−H2(δ)−H2(δ + 2f(εs), 0) (31)
where δ is the bit error rate found in the verification
test and f(εs) is defined as in eq. (20). (We assume
δ + 2f(εs) < 1/2.)
Note that in the formulation of Theorem 3 we have
assumed that all signals are detected — we have not
considered the effects of loss in the channel or imper-
fect detector efficiency. In principle, Eve can amplify the
basis-dependence of Fred’s attack by eliminating some of
the signals. In the worst case, the coin is an X = 1 eigen-
state for each of the signals that Eve removes. Then, if
a fraction f of all the signals are lost, ∆ is enhanced
according to
∆→ ∆′ ≤ ∆/(1− f) . (32)
The effects of loss will be discussed further in Sec. XII
and Sec. XIII.
IX. IMPERFECT OBLIVIOUS SOURCE AND
IMPERFECT DETECTOR
We recall that Koashi and Preskill [6] proved the secu-
rity of BB84 in the case where the detector is perfect and
the signals emitted by the source, when averaged over the
key bits, are basis independent (an oblivious source). The
situation they considered can be depicted as in Fig. 3.
In effect, Eve prepares an entangled state of n qubits,
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which are delivered to Bob, and n general signals, which
are delivered to Alice. To generate the sifted key, Alice
performs an uncharacterized measurement on each of her
n signals, and Bob performs a standard measurement on
each of his n qubits. By simply reversing the roles of
Alice and Bob, we obtain the situation considered by
Mayers, in which the source is perfect and the detector
is uncharacterized [2].
Eve
@ H
a
Measure Z
Uncharacterized
Measurement
anything
qubit
 
FIG. 3. An uncharacterized oblivious source and a perfect
detector. Eve prepares an entangled state of n signals and
n qubits. Alice prepares an uncharacterized measurement on
the n signals and Bob performs standard measurements on
the n qubits. Interchanging the roles of Alice and Bob, we
obtain the case of a perfect source and an uncharacterized
detector.
We will now consider a special case of the Koashi-
Preskill source: the source is oblivious, but we further
assume that the source can be realized by the prepara-
tion of a basis-independent entangled state of the signal
space and a qubit, followed by a basis-dependent channel
applied to the qubit, and finally a standard measurement
of the qubit. However, we will go beyond Koashi and
Preskill by allowing the detector to have basis-dependent
flaws, as shown in Fig. 4. Actually, it will be no harder
to analyze the more general case shown in Fig. 5: Eve
prepares an arbitrary state of n entangled signals, which
is mapped by Fred to a state of n pairs of qubits; then
the pairs are distributed to Alice and Bob, who perform
standard measurements. An important feature of this
setting is that, although Fred’s channel can depend on
the basis in which Alice and Bob measure, there is no
way for Fred to convey any information about the basis
to Eve. In this sense the source is oblivious.
Eve
@ H
a
Measure Z
H
a
Measure Z
 
EA,a
EB,a
FIG. 4. An oblivious source and an imperfect detector.
Eve
@ H
a
Measure Z
H
a
Measure Z
 
Ea
FIG. 5. Stronger version of the attack in Fig. 4.
We will further assume that the channel applied by
Fred is a product of n individual channels, and that each
of these n channels depends only weakly on the basis.
For analyzing the impact on the quantum coin, it will be
convenient to characterize the basis dependence of Fred’s
attack as follows: A channel E that takes Eve’s arbitrary
pair to a pair of qubits can be realized by its dilation, an
isometric embedding U of Eve’s space into the space of
the qubit pair and a suitable ancilla. Thus Fred’s basis-
dependent individual attack can be expressed as the ten-
sor product Ua ≡
⊗n
i=1 U
(i)
ai , where i labels the pairs,
and ai denotes the basis choice for the ith signal. Fur-
thermore the attack depends only weakly on the basis,
in the sense that 14‖U
(i)
0 − U (i)1 ‖2sup < ε for each i.
Using this characterization, we can analyze how Fred’s
attack affects the coins that determine the basis. The ba-
sis choice is determined by n quantum coins, each a qubit
initially prepared in the X = 1 eigenstate, and suppose
that the initial state of the n pairs and their environment
(before Fred’s attack) is the pure state |ϕ〉. Then after
Fred’s attack, the state of the coins, the pairs, and the
environment can be written as
1
2n/2
∑
a
Ua|ϕ〉 ⊗ |Z; a〉 , (33)
where a is the n bit string indicating the basis choice,
and the states {|Z; a〉} are the basis states of the coins in
the Z basis. After Fred’s attack, suppose that all of the
n coins are measured in the X basis. Let x be an n-bit
string, and let |X ;x〉 denote a product of n X eigenstates,
such that Xi = 1 for xi = 0 and Xi = −1 for xi = 1.
Then the probability that the measurement of the coins
yields the outcome x is
P (x) =
∥∥∥∥∥ 12n/2
∑
a
Ua|ϕ〉 ⊗ 〈X ;x|Z; a〉
∥∥∥∥∥
2
,
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 12n
(∑
a
(−1)a.x Ua
)
|ϕ〉
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 12n
(∑
a
(−1)a.x Ua
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
sup
. (34)
The sum in this expression can be factorized:
1
2n
∑
a
(−1)a.x Ua =
n⊗
i=1
1
2
(
U
(i)
0 + (−1)xiU (i)1
)
. (35)
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Furthermore, the sup norm of a tensor product is a prod-
uct of sup norms. Since for each i∥∥∥∥12
(
U
(i)
0 − U (i)1
)∥∥∥∥
2
sup
< ε ,
∥∥∥∥12
(
U
(i)
0 + U
(i)
1
)∥∥∥∥
2
sup
≤ 1 , (36)
we have∥∥∥∥∥ 12n
(∑
a
(−1)a.x Ua
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
sup
< (ε)|x| , (37)
where |x| denotes the Hamming weight of x, and there-
fore
P (x) < (ε)|x| . (38)
From this bound on P (x), it is elementary to show that
the probability that |x| > (eε+ε′)n is exponentially small
for any positive ε′ and e = 2.71828 · · ·. Therefore we have
Lemma 3. A weakly basis-dependent individual
oblivious attack by Fred is ∆-balanced. Consider
an individual attack by Fred, in which Fred applies U
(i)
0 to
the ith pair if the basis choice is ai = 0 and applies U
(i)
1
if the basis choice is ai = 1, where
1
4‖U
(i)
0 −U (i)1 ‖2sup < ε
for each i. This attack is ∆− balanced for any ∆ > eε.
And from Theorem 2 we obtain:
Theorem 4. Security of entanglement-based key
distribution against weakly basis-dependent indi-
vidual oblivious attacks.. Consider an individual at-
tack by Fred, in which Fred applies U
(i)
0 to the ith pair
if the basis choice is ai = 0 and applies U
(i)
1 if the basis
choice is ai = 1, where
1
4‖U
(i)
0 − U (i)1 ‖2sup < ε for each i.
Then the entanglement-based key distribution protocol is
secure, and secure final key can be extracted from sifted
key at the asymptotic rate
R = Max (1−H2(δ)−H2(δ + 2f(eε), 0) (39)
where δ is the bit error rate found in the verification
test and f(eε) is defined as in eq. (20). (We assume
δ + 2f(eε) < 1/2.)
In our formulation of Theorem 4, we have chosen to
characterize the basis-dependence of the attack in terms
of the sup norm distance between the two isometric em-
beddings U0 and U1 that realize Fred’s channels E0 and
E1. It would be more natural to use the intrinsic distance
‖E0−E1‖⋄ defined by the “diamond norm” [31]. But the
proof of Lemma 3 uses the property that U0 and U1 are
close in the sup norm; therefore if we want to reformulate
Theorem 4 using the characterization that the channels
are close in the diamond norm, we need to show that
if two channels are close to one another in the diamond
norm, then the dilations of the channels can be chosen to
be close in the sup norm. The following lemma, proved
in Appendix A, partially solves this problem:
Lemma 4. Similar channels have similar dila-
tions. Suppose that E0 and E1 are quantum channels
mapping a d-dimensional system S to a d′-dimensional
system T , such that ‖ E0 − E1 ‖⋄< ε. Then there are
dilations U0 and U1 of the channels (isometric embed-
dings of S in TE, where E is dd′-dimensional) such that
‖ U0 − U1 ‖2sup< dε.
However, Lemma 4 has the unpleasant property that
the dimension d appears in the upper bound on ‖ U0 −
U1 ‖2sup. In principle, the state that Eve delivers to the
detector could have arbitrarily high dimension, and The-
orem 4 no longer applies if we fix ε while allowing the
dimension to grow without bound. For that reason, we
prefer to formulate the statement of Theorem 4 in terms
of the sup norm, rather than inferring a bound on the dis-
tance between dilations in the sup norm from a bound
on the distance between channels in the diamond norm.
X. MISALIGNMENT
Suppose that Bob is unable to control the orientation
of his detector perfectly. When he tries to measure the
polarization of his qubit along the z-axis, he actually
measures along an axis that lies somewhere in a cone
around the z-axis with opening half-angle θ; similarly
when he tries to measure along the x-axis, he can only
guarantee that his axis is within angle θ of the desired
axis. This scenario is equivalent to one in which Bob’s
measurement is perfect, but Fred rotates the polarization
of the qubit by an angle up to θ right before the mea-
surement. Furthermore the rotation Fred applies may
depend on whether Bob is trying to measure Z or X ,
possibly enhancing the phase error rate relative to the
bit error rate.
Suppose, in addition, that Alice is unable to control
the orientation of her source perfectly — it too might
be rotated by an angle up to θ from the ideal orienta-
tion. Equivalently, we may suppose that Alice’s source is
perfect, but that Fred rotates the qubit slightly (exploit-
ing his knowledge of the basis) immediately after it is
emitted by the source. One way to realize such a source
is for Alice to prepare a perfect Bell pair |φ+〉 and give
half to Fred (who rotates his half); then Alice performs a
standard measurement on her half. But a unitary trans-
formation U applied by Fred to his qubit is equivalent to
UT applied to Alice’s (where UT denotes the transpose
of U); therefore it would make no difference if Alice’s
qubit were rotated instead of Fred’s. Looked at another
way, the reason we can replace Fred’s rotation by a ro-
tation acting on Alice’s qubit is that the source is obliv-
ious — the emitted state, averaged over the key bits, is
maximally mixed, and Fred’s attack does not change this
property.
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In the entanglement-based protocol, then, the attack
in which Fred rotates the orientation of the source and
detector is equivalent to an attack in which pairs of qubits
are prepared by Eve however she pleases and distributed
to Alice and Bob, and then Fred rotates both Alice’s
and Bob’s qubits slightly (by no more than θ) just before
standard measurements are performed. Furthermore, we
are assuming that Fred’s attack is individual — the ro-
tation he applies to the ith pair is controlled by only the
outcome of the flip of the ith coin. Therefore, Theorem 4
applies. We can estimate the rate of generation of secure
key by calculating the maximum value of
1
4
‖U0 − U1‖2sup = sup
|ψ〉
1
2
(
1− Re〈ψ|U−11 U0|ψ〉
)
〈ψ|ψ〉 , (40)
where U0 and U1 are unitary transformations applied to
the pairs that are consistent with our characterization of
the source and detector.
It is not hard to see that the supremum occurs for
|ψ〉 a maximally entangled state, which, after a suitable
choice of basis and phase conventions we may choose to
be |φ+〉. Fred applies separate single-qubit rotations to
Alice’s qubit and to Bob’s; acting on |φ+〉, the combined
effect of the two is equivalent to a rotation applied to
Bob’s qubit alone, by an angle no larger than 2θ. The
overlap 〈φ+|U−11 U0|φ+〉 is minimized (for |θ| ≤ pi/4) if
U−11 = U0; we may choose U0 to be the transformation
I ⊗ U˜0, where U˜0 is the single-qubit rotation
U˜0 =
(
eiθ 0
0 e−iθ
)
. (41)
We find that
〈φ+|I ⊗ U˜20 |φ+〉 = cos 2θ , (42)
which implies
1
4
‖U0 − U1‖2sup = sin2 θ . (43)
From Lemma 3, then, we find that Fred’s attack is
(e·sin2 θ+ε)-balanced for any positive ε, and we therefore
obtain
Theorem 5. Security of BB84 against individual
misalignment of the source and detector. Suppose
that, for each signal, Fred can perform a basis-dependent
adjustment of the polarization axes of the source and de-
tector by any angle up to θ. Then the BB84 protocol is
secure, and secure final key can be extracted from sifted
key at the asymptotic rate
R = Max
(
1−H2(δ)−H2(δ + 2f(e · sin2 θ), 0
)
(44)
where δ is the bit error rate found in the verification test
and f(e · sin2 θ) is defined as in eq. (20). (We assume
δ + 2f(e · sin2 θ) < 1/2 and θ ≤ pi/4).)
Thus for δ = 0 we obtain a nonzero rate of key generation
for θ < 5.92◦.
We remark again that in the formulation of Theorem 5
the misalignment of the detector or source is assumed to
be adversarial, within the angular tolerance specified in
our characterization of the device — Alice and Bob wish
to conceal the key from the Eve/Fred alliance. The argu-
ments of Mayers [2] (for detectors) and Koashi-Preskill [6]
(for sources) apply to an uncharacterized misalignment
that is not adversarial — Alice and Bob wish to conceal
the key from Eve and don’t care what Fred knows. In
that case, the large potential misalignments do not re-
duce the key generation rate below that achievable with
perfect devices, given a specified bit error rate δ observed
in the test. However, the conclusion of [2] about security
in the case of an uncharacterized detector applies only
if the source is perfect, and likewise the conclusion [6]
about the case of an uncharacterized source applies only
if the detector is perfect. In contrast, our analysis applies
to the case where both the detector and the source are
subject to a characterized misalignment.
XI. GENERIC INDIVIDUAL FLAWS IN SOURCE
AND DETECTOR
Suppose that the source and detector are both subject
to individual flaws that depend weakly on the basis. The
source can be modeled as in Sec. VIII: For each signal
to be sent, Fred first prepares a joint state of a qubit A′
and a general system A. The state that Fred prepares
can depend on the basis. Alice then launches the signal
by performing a standard measurement on the qubit. If
n signals are to be sent, Fred prepares a product state⊗n
i=1 ρ
(i)
ai , where ai denotes the basis choice for the ith
signal. Thus we say that Fred’s attack on the source is
individual. The basis dependence of the source is weak
in the sense that
√
F (ρ
(i)
0 , ρ
(i)
1 ) > 1− 2εs for each i.
We model the detector as follows: Each signal, after
Eve’s basis-independent attack, is a state of a general
system B. The signal is received by Fred, who applies a
channel that “squashes” the signal to a qubit B′; Fred’s
channel may depend on the basis in which Bob will con-
duct his measurement. Then Bob performs a standard
single-qubit measurement on the qubit. Fred’s basis-
dependent squash can be realized as a basis-dependent
isometric embedding of B in B′E where E is a suit-
able ancilla. If n signals are received by the detec-
tor, this transformation can be expressed as the ten-
sor product
⊗n
i=1 U
(i)
ai . Thus we say that Fred’s at-
tack on the detector is individual. Furthermore the at-
tack depends only weakly on the basis, in the sense that
1
4‖U
(i)
0 − U (i)1 ‖2sup < εd for each i.
By simultaneously allowing basis-dependent flaws in
the source and in the detector, we are going beyond the
analysis in Sec. VIII and Sec. IX. But we may anticipate
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that, as in those cases considered previously, we can show
that the attack is ∆-balanced for small ∆, if εs and εd are
small. Indeed, this is the case; for example, if εs = εd ≡ ε
we can show
Lemma 5. Suppose that the source and detector are
subject to basis-dependent flaws. The ith signal sent by
Alice is prepared by performing a standard qubit mea-
surement on half of an entangled state — this state is
ρ
(i)
0 when the Z basis is declared and ρ
(i)
1 when the X
basis is declared, where
√
F (ρ
(i)
0 , ρ
(i)
1 ) > 1 − 2ε for all i.
The ith signal received by the detector is first squashed to
a qubit and then a standard measurement is performed.
The squash is described by a channel that can be real-
ized by the isometric embedding U
(i)
0 when the Z basis
is declared and by U
(i)
1 when the X channel is declared,
where 14‖U
(i)
0 − U (i)1 ‖2sup < ε for each i. This attack is
∆− balanced for any ∆ > 8√ε+ 4ε.
Lemma 5, together with Theorem 2, provides a proof of
security for generic individual flaws in the source and de-
tector that depend sufficiently weakly on the basis. We
omit the proof of Lemma 5, which is rather long and
unenlightening.
A surprising feature of Lemma 5 is the term scaling
like
√
ε in our bound on ∆ — one might reasonably have
expected a stronger result, that the attack is ∆-balanced
for some ∆ linear in ε. However, we have not succeeded
in proving a linear bound.
XII. TAGGED SIGNALS
Suppose that a fraction ∆ of the qubits emitted by the
source are tagged by Fred. The tag informs Eve which ba-
sis was used, so that she can measure the qubit without
disturbing it. Eve has no information about the basis
used for the untagged qubits (a fraction 1 − ∆ of the
total).
Note that tagged qubits arise in QKD with weak coher-
ent states. The phase of a signal emitted by a coherent
light source may be regarded as random if Eve has no in-
formation about the phase [11,32], so that the signal state
is a mixture of photon number eigenstates. If the source
emits more than one photon, we pessimistically assume
that Eve stores the extra photons until after the bases
are broadcast, and then measures in the proper basis to
learn the key bit without introducing any disturbance.
Then the tagging probability is ∆ = pM/pD, where pM
is the probability of emitting a multiphoton, and pD is
the probability that an emitted photon is detected (we
pessimistically assume that all of the photons that fail
to arrive were emitted as single photons). Arguably we
know pM if we understand our source well, and pD can
be measured. Hence ∆ is a known (or at least knowable)
parameter characterizing a practical implementation of
quantum key distribution.
We can incorporate tagging into our source model by
allowing Fred to append to each qubit emitted by Al-
ice’s source an auxiliary qutrit that conveys information
about the basis to Eve. For a fraction ∆ of the signals
(Fred gets to decide which ones), he sets the value of
the qutrit to |a〉, where a = 0 indicates the Z basis and
a = 1 indicates the X basis. For the remaining fraction
1−∆ of the qubits sent by Alice, Fred sets the qutrit to
|2〉, passing no basis information to Eve. Eve can read
the auxiliary qutrit to learn the basis for each tagged
qubit, and so measure the key bit without introducing
any disturbance. If each coin that determines the basis
choice is a qubit initially prepared in the X = 1 eigen-
state (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, then Fred’s attack causes the coin to
decohere in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis if the corresponding signal
is tagged, but leaves the coin undisturbed if the signal is
untagged.
It follows that the attack is (∆/2 + ε)-balanced for
any positive ε, and we could prove security by applying
Theorem 2. But in this case it is possible to prove a
stronger result, because we know more about the quan-
tum state of the coins. Suppose that, as in Sec. VII,
we apply controlled-NOT gates from the pairs to the
coins, transforming n
(Z)
gap to
1
2
∑n
i=1 Zcoin,i. The action
on the coin of a controlled-NOT gate preserves an X-
eigenstate. Therefore, the probability distribution gov-
erning the value of n
(Z)
gap is the same as the probability
distribution governing 12
∑n
i=1 Zcoin,i in a state of the
n coins with the property that n(1 − ∆) of the coins
are in eigenstates of X with eigenvalue +1. Hence with
high probability |n(Z)gap| < n∆/2 + ε for any positive ε.
A similar argument applies to |n(X)gap |, and we find that
|ngap| = |n(Z)gap + n(X)gap | < n∆ + ε for any positive ε. We
conclude that secure key can be extracted from sifted key
at the asymptotic rate
R = 1−H2(δ)−H2(δ +∆) , (45)
where we have assumed that δ +∆ ≤ 1/2.
Note that to obtain the upper bound on ngap, all that
we needed was the property that Fred interacts with no
more than n∆ of the coins. Therefore, the argument
can be applied more broadly than to the particular tag-
ging model that we have defined above. For example,
it applies to a setting where there are flaws in the ran-
dom number generators used by Alice and Bob to select
the basis and the key bits. Suppose that for a fraction
n(1−∆) of the signals, the basis choice and the key bit
are chosen by flipping fair coins, but for a fraction n∆ of
the signals, Fred is free to choose the basis and the key
bit however he chooses. In this model, if the source and
the detector are perfect otherwise, Fred need not touch
n(1−∆) of the coins, and secure key can be generated at
the rate eq. (45). (In this estimate of the rate, however,
we have continued to assume that the qubits selected for
the verification test are a fair sample, and so provide an
accurate estimate of the error rate for the key generating
pairs. The argument can be extended further to cover
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the case where Fred is permitted to select a small por-
tion of the test set, by adjusting the estimate of the error
rate to take into account the bias in the test.)
With a more sophisticated argument we can obtain a
higher rate of secure key generation than eq. (45). After
correcting errors in the sifted key (sacrificing a fraction
H2(δ) of the key, asymptotically) we imagine executing
privacy amplification on two different strings, the sifted
key bits arising from the tagged qubits and the sifted key
bits arising from the untagged qubits. Since the privacy
amplification scheme described in Sec. III is linear (the
private key can be computed by applying the C2 parity
check matrix to the sifted key after error correction), the
key obtained is the bitwise XOR
suntagged ⊕ stagged (46)
of keys that could be obtained from the tagged and un-
tagged bits separately. If suntagged is private and random,
then it doesn’t matter if Eve knows everything about
stagged – the sum is still private and random.
Therefore we ask if privacy amplification is success-
ful applied to the untagged bits alone. Under the worst
case assumption that the bit error rate is zero for tagged
qubits, the overall bit error rate δ˜ is related to the bit
error rate δ˜untagged for the untagged qubits by
δ˜ = (1−∆)δ˜untagged . (47)
Since the bit errors and phase errors are related by
symmetry for the untagged qubits, the phase error rate
δ˜p,untagged for the untagged qubits satisfies
δ˜p,untagged < δ˜untagged + ε =
δ˜
1−∆ + ε (48)
with high probability. Since the error rate δ observed in
the test provides a good estimate of δ˜ for the key gener-
ating pairs, we conclude that
δ˜p,untagged <
δ
1−∆ + ε
′ . (49)
with high probability, for any positive ε′ and sufficiently
large n. If there are n bits of sifted key, then (1 − ∆)n
of these bits come from untagged qubits, and (since bit
errors are already corrected) we can extract a private key
by sacrificing a fraction H2(δ˜p,untagged + ε
′′) of these for
privacy amplification. Thus we have proved:
Theorem 6. Security of BB84 against tagging.
Suppose that Fred interacts with only n∆ of the n coins
that determine the basis used by Alice and Bob. Then
the BB84 protocol is secure, and secure final key can be
extracted from sifted key at the asymptotic rate
R = Max
(
(1−∆)−H2(δ) − (1−∆)H2
(
δ
1−∆
)
, 0
)
(50)
where δ is the bit error rate found in the verification test
(assuming δ/(1 − ∆) < 1/2). In particular, this rate
of key generation is achievable, assuming that the source
and the detector are perfect otherwise, if Fred reveals the
basis to Eve for n∆ of the signals, or if Fred chooses the
basis and key bits for n∆ of the signals.
In the case where the source emits weak coherent states
with random phases, a rate of key generation similar to
eq. (50) was established by Inamori, Lu¨tkenhaus, and
Mayers (ILM) [8]. Actually, the rate quoted by ILM is
below R in Eq. (50) — in their Eq. (18) the argument of
H2 in the last term is 2δ/(1−∆) rather than δ/(1−∆).
However, we believe that their argument can be refined to
match the rate Eq. (50). With that refinement the ILM
result is stronger in a sense than what we have derived
here, as it applies to the case of a general uncharacterized
detector.
Theorem 6 can be applied if there is loss in the quan-
tum channel connecting Alice and Bob and/or if Bob’s
detector has imperfect efficiency, provided that the loss
is basis-independent. For example, suppose that each
signal emitted by Alice’s source is a phase-randomized
weak coherent state with mean photon number µ ≪ 1,
so that the signal is a single photon with probability
p1 = µ+O
(
µ2
)
, and more than one photon with proba-
bility pM =
1
2µ
2 +O
(
µ3
)
. We can describe these signals
by imagining a source that never emits multiple photons,
followed by a basis-dependent attack by Fred in which
Fred interacts with a fraction pM of all the coins. Now
suppose that Eve’s attack can be modeled by a basis-
independent lossy channel, such that a fraction η of all
the nonvacuum signals are detected. (Here by “basis-
independent” we mean that Eve’s attack has no a priori
dependence on the basis, though of course Eve can ex-
ploit the multiphotons to acquire some information about
the basis; the important thing is that Eve can launch her
attack without interacting with the coins.) Then a frac-
tion pD = η
(
µ+O(µ2)
)
of all the signals are detected,
and of the coins associated with detected signals, Fred
interacts with at most a fraction
∆ = pM/pD =
1
2η
(
µ+O
(
µ2
))
. (51)
Sifted key is generated at the rate
1
2
νpD ≈ 1
2
νηµ ≈ νη2∆ , (52)
where ν is the repetition frequency of the source. There-
fore, if ∆ (and hence also the rate R of generation of final
key from sifted key) is held fixed as η gets small, then the
overall key generation rate 12νpDR is O(η
2), as ILM ob-
served [8]. This scaling of the rate with η holds approxi-
mately as long as dark counts in the detector are not too
important, so that the bit error rate δ is roughly indepen-
dent of η. In some current implementations of quantum
key distribution using weak coherent states transmitted
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through optical fibers, dark counts are relatively unim-
portant, and our analysis of security is applicable, up to
a range of approximately 20 km.
Theorem 6 applies if Fred tags any n∆ of the signals.
But it does not apply to a coherent superposition of such
attacks. Suppose, for example, that in the entanglement-
based protocol, Fred’s attack on the pairs and the coins
produces a state
|Ψ〉 =
∑
S:|S|≤n∆
aS |ΨS〉 ; (53)
here the sum is over subsets S that contain no more than
n∆ of the n pairs, and |ΨS〉 is the state resulting from
tagging the pairs in the set S. Although Theorem 6 does
not apply to a general superposition of tagged states as
in eq. (53), Theorem 2 does apply to this case. After we
trace out Fred’s labeling qutrits, the state of the coin can
be realized as an ensemble of states, where for each state
in the ensemble at least n(1−∆) of the coins are X = 1
eigenstates and the rest are mixtures of Z eigenstates.
Therefore, if the coins are all measured in the X basis,
with high probability the number of coins for which the
outcome X = −1 is found will be less than n(∆/2 + ε).
Thus the attack is (∆/2 + ε)-balanced for any positive
ε and sufficiently large n, and it follows from Theorem
2 that secure key can be generated at the corresponding
rate (a lower rate than found in Theorem 6).
In particular, then, Theorem 2 can be applied to a gen-
eral source that emits signals that are sufficiently close
to perfect single photon pulses, even if the multiphotons
occur with nonrandom phases. Unfortunately, though,
our arguments do not allow us to address the case where
the source emits weak coherent states with nonrandom
phases — in that case the states are dominated by the
amplitude to emit the vacuum state, and the tagging
model we have analyzed here does not apply. This diffi-
culty seems to be more than a mere shortcoming of our
model; the deeper problem is that weak coherent states
with nonrandom phases leak a significant amount of basis
information, which may compromise security.
As for all of the cases that we consider in this paper,
the crux of our analysis of tagging is a bound on the
phase error rate δ˜p of the key generating pairs that holds
with high probability — it does not suffice for δ˜p to be
bounded after averaging over Fred’s strategy. Therefore,
our security proof need not apply for a highly correlated
basis-dependent attack on the signals, even if the bit error
rate δ˜ and phase error rate δ˜p resulting from the attack
have mean values that are nearly equal.2
For example, suppose that with a small probability r,
Fred tells Eve the basis for every signal, while with prob-
ability 1 − r, Fred tells Eve nothing. Then on average
the disparity between the bit error rate and the phase
error rate is small. However, with a fixed probability r
that does not depend on the key length, Eve can learn
the whole key. Therefore, the quantum key distribution
protocol is insecure for a source of this type.
XIII. TROJAN PONY
Suppose that the detector is not perfectly efficient. A
fraction ∆ of the signals that enter the detector fail to
trigger it, resulting in no recorded outcome. Suppose fur-
ther that Fred, who knows Bob’s basis, controls whether
the detector fires or not, subject to the constraint that
only a fraction ∆ of the detection events can be elimi-
nated. Note that the parameter ∆ can be measured in
the protocol.
Fred can use his power to disguise Eve’s attack, en-
hancing the detection rate when Bob measures in the
same basis as Eve did and suppressing the detection rate
when Bob measures in a different basis than Eve’s. This
is a limited version of the “Trojan horse” attack [28] —
we call it the “Trojan pony.” As we remarked in Sec. V,
one version of the Trojan pony attack can be launched
if Bob’s detector is configured as a polarization beam
splitter that directs the signals to a pair of threshold
detectors; Eve can ensure that the detector fails to regis-
ter a conclusive result by flooding it with many photons.
We will analyze this attack in a different setting, in which
Bob’s detector receives qubits rather than bosonic modes.
In the EDP setting, we allow Fred to eliminate a frac-
tion ∆ of the pairs (corresponding to the qubits for which
he “turns off” Bob’s detector). In the worst case, every
pair that he eliminates has a bit error and no phase error.
Before any pairs were eliminated, the error rate was es-
sentially the same in both bases — call this rate p. After
eliminating the undetected pairs, the error rates are
δ˜ ≈ p−∆
1−∆ , δ˜p ≈
p
1−∆ (54)
(assuming ∆ ≤ p ≤ 1−∆). Note that, for ease of presen-
tation, we have not included the ε’s in eq. (54); instead
we have used the symbol ≈ to indicate relations that are
satisfied to arbitrarily good accuracy with high probabil-
ity asymptotically. Eliminating p we find
δ˜p ≈ δ˜ + ∆
1−∆ , (55)
and, since the error rate δ measured in the test provides
a reliable estimate of δ˜, we infer that final key can be
generated from sifted key at the achievable rate
R = 1−H2(δ)−H2
(
δ +
∆
1−∆
)
, (56)
2We thank Dominic Mayers for a helpful discussion of this point.
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where we have assumed that
δ +
∆
1−∆ ≤ 1/2 . (57)
We can use similar reasoning if the detector efficiency is
low, but we trust that most of the instances where the de-
tector fails to fire are chosen at random, and only a small
percentage of all the detector failures are due to Fred’s
intervention. In the absence of other imperfections, ran-
dom misfires merely reduce the number of sifted key bits,
but without breaking the symmetry between the bases.
Eq. (56) still applies if a fraction f of detection events
are removed by random errors, and a fraction ∆ of the
remaining events are removed adversarially, resulting in
an overall efficiency η = (1 − f)(1 − ∆). Thus we have
proved
Theorem 7. Security of BB84 against basis-
dependent detector efficiency. Suppose that of the
signals that arrive at Bob’s detector, a fraction f cho-
sen at random are removed, and of those that remain
a fraction ∆ chosen adversarially by Fred are also re-
moved, so that the overall efficiency of the detector is
η = (1 − f)(1 − ∆). Then the BB84 protocol is secure,
and secure final key can be extracted from the (detected)
sifted key at the asymptotic rate
R = Max
(
1−H2(δ)−H2
(
δ +
∆
1−∆
)
, 0
)
(58)
where δ is the bit error rate found in the verification test
(assuming δ +∆/(1−∆) < 1/2).
Note that we can measure the efficiency η in the proto-
col, but can determine ∆ only by acquiring a good un-
derstanding of the vulnerability of the detector to tam-
pering. In fact, in current implementations the typical
efficiency for detection of single photons at telecommu-
nication wavelengths is about 15% [33]. Theorem 7 can
also be applied to the case where basis-dependent losses
occur in the quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob,
with ∆ parametrizing the basis dependence.
ILM [8,27] discussed the specific type of Trojan pony
attack in which Eve floods Bob’s polarization beam split-
ter with many photons of the same polarization, generat-
ing a “double click” in Bob’s two photon detectors when
he tries to measure the polarization in the conjugate ba-
sis. For this case they proposed that Bob choose his
key bit randomly each time he encounters a double click
event. Security of this scheme is ensured by the result of
Mayers [2]: the POVM that assigns a random outcome
to the “double-click” subspace is a possible measurement
that Fred could arrange, and Mayers proved security for
an arbitrary detector POVM. If double clicks occur a
fraction ∆ of the time, and the bit error rate is δ when
single clicks occur, then the overall error rate under the
ILM prescription will be (1 −∆)δ + ∆/2, resulting in a
key generation rate
R = 1− 2H2
(
(1−∆)δ +∆/2
)
. (59)
The rate is further enhanced by the factor (1 − ∆)−1
relative to Eq. (56), since all detection events, including
the double clicks, contribute to the sifted key. Thus the
achievable rate established by ILM exceeds the rate we
have derived, except for relatively large ∆ and relatively
small δ. However, the two results cannot be compared
directly, because they apply to two different models of
the adversary. The ILM result Eq. (59) applies to a par-
ticular Trojan pony attack that can be launched by Eve
if the Bob/Fred POVM has suitable properties; it pro-
vides a condition for Eve (but not Fred) to have negli-
gible information about the key. Eq. (56) is the rate at
which key can be extracted under a Trojan pony attack
in which Fred receives qubits, and can prevent some of
the qubits from registering in Bob’s detector. But in this
case the key is kept secret not just from Eve but from
the Eve/Fred alliance.
A different type of issue relating to detector efficiency
arises if the detector failures occur at different rates when
measuring in the X and Z bases, but are otherwise ran-
domly distributed. The bias in the detector efficiency
breaks the symmetry between the bases, but a simple
variant of the Shor-Preskill argument still applies. In
the entanglement distillation picture, we may imagine
that Alice and Bob at first share many noisy pairs; fur-
thermore, after a random permutation unknown to the
adversary is applied, the pairs are symmetrized so that
all have the same marginal density operator. Then some
of the pairs are removed from the sample by a random
process. Though the probability of removal may depend
on the basis used to generate the key bit, Alice and Bob
can still infer the phase error rate from the bit error rate
if they conduct a refined data analysis [25], measuring
separate error rates δX and δZ for the X and Z bases
respectively. If a fraction pX of the sifted key bits are
generated in the X basis and a fraction pZ in the Z ba-
sis (where pX + pZ = 1), so that the bit error rate is
δ = pXδX + pZδZ , then the phase error rate to insert in
Eq. (4) becomes δp = pXδZ + pZδX .
XIV. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that the BB84 quantum key distribu-
tion protocol is secure when the source and/or detector
are subject to small errors that are controlled by an ad-
versary who knows the basis used by Alice and Bob. We
have formulated a method for estimating the key genera-
tion rate in the presence of such errors, and we have ap-
plied the method to various model sources and detectors.
Our results are complementary to earlier proofs of secu-
rity [2,6] that apply to flaws in the apparatus that may
be large but are nonadversarial; furthermore, our results
unlike those of [2,6] apply when both the source and the
detector have small basis-dependent flaws, as will be the
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case in typical real-world implementations of quantum
key distribution. We have argued that the security holes
of real sources and detectors can be usefully investigated
within our framework, and we expect that the methods
we have developed will find further applications.
However, the model sources and detectors to which
our analysis applies are not completely general. In our
model of the source, each signal is launched by prepar-
ing an entangled state of a qubit and a general system,
followed by an ideal measurement of the qubit. To estab-
lish security, we require that the entangled state depend
only weakly on the basis used in the protocol. With
this model, we are unable to treat, for example, the case
where the source emits weak coherent states with non-
random phases. Likewise, we model the detector as a
quantum channel followed by an ideal measurement of
a qubit, and to establish security we require that the
quantum channel depend only weakly on the basis. In
particular, we are unable to treat the case where the sig-
nals received by the detector reside in a Hilbert space of
arbitrarily high dimension.
Various other issues regarding the security of BB84 and
other quantum key distribution protocols have not been
addressed here. We have not considered how to charac-
terize devices reliably using testing equipment that is it-
self untrustworthy (as in [7]). We have not discussed how
to improve the rate of key generation beyond the rate in
Eq. (4) through privacy amplification schemes that use
two-way communication between Alice and Bob [15]. Fi-
nally, our security analysis applies to the asymptotic limit
of an infinite key — we have not analyzed the practical
aspects of error correction and privacy amplification in
the case of finite key length.
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APPENDIX A. SIMILAR CHANNELS HAVE
SIMILAR DILATIONS
Here we will prove:
Lemma 4. Similar channels have similar dila-
tions. Suppose that E0 and E1 are quantum channels
mapping a d-dimensional system S to a d′-dimensional
system T , such that ‖ E0 − E1 ‖⋄< ε. Then there are
dilations U0 and U1 of the channels (isometric embed-
dings of S in TE, where E is dd′-dimensional) such that
‖ U0 − U1 ‖2sup< dε.
It is convenient to characterize a quantum channel E
mapping system S to system T by considering the action
of I⊗E on a reference system R and the system S, where
dim R = dim S ≡ d. Let
|Φ˜〉 =
∑
i
|i〉R ⊗ |i〉S (60)
denote an unconventionally normalized maximally entan-
gled pure state on RS, satisfying 〈Φ˜|Φ˜〉 = d. We may
define
ρ˜ = I ⊗ E(|Φ˜〉〈Φ˜|) , (61)
where ρ˜ is an unconventionally normalized density oper-
ator on RT , satisfying tr ρ˜ = d. The action of E on a
pure state |ϕ〉 =∑i ai|i〉 on S can then be expressed as
E(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|) = 〈ϕ∗|ρ˜|ϕ∗〉 (62)
where |ϕ∗〉 = ∑i a∗i |i〉 is the “index state” on R corre-
sponding to |ϕ〉. If we introduce an additional system E
(the “environment,” of dimension dd′), we can construct
a purification |Φ˜′〉 of ρ˜ on RTE such that 〈Φ˜′|Φ˜′〉 = d.
This purification defines a “dilation” U of the channel E
that realizes E as an isometric embedding of S in TE.
The action of the dilation on the pure state |ϕ〉 is
|ϕ〉 → U |ϕ〉 = 〈ϕ∗|Φ˜′〉 . (63)
Now suppose that E0 and E1 are two channels acting
on S, satisfying the inequality
‖E0 − E1‖⋄ < ε , (64)
and that ρ˜0 and ρ˜1 are the corresponding states obtained
from the action of I⊗E0 and I⊗E1 on |Φ˜〉. The diamond
norm [31] is defined by
‖E‖⋄ ≡ sup
X 6=0
‖I ⊗ E(X)‖tr
‖X‖tr ; (65)
since 〈Φ˜|Φ˜〉 = d, it follows that the trace distance be-
tween ρ˜0 and ρ˜1 satisfies
‖ ρ˜0 − ρ˜1 ‖tr < dε . (66)
Since, for conventionally normalized density operators,
the fidelity and trace distance are related by
√
F (ρ0, ρ1) ≥ 1− 1
2
‖ ρ0 − ρ1 ‖tr , (67)
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it follows [29,30] that ρ˜0 and ρ˜1 have purifications |Φ˜′0〉
and |Φ˜′1〉 on RSE with norm
√
d and overlap satisfying
Re 〈Φ˜′1|Φ˜′0〉 > d
(
1− ε
2
)
. (68)
This large overlap of the purifications |Φ˜′0〉 and |Φ˜′1〉
implies that the corresponding dilations U0 and U1 of
the channels are close to one another in the sup norm.
Given any |ϕ〉 on S, we may regard it as one element of
a basis {|ϕi〉} for S. Then eq. (68) may be rewritten as
Re
d∑
i=1
〈ϕi|U †1U0|ϕi〉
= Re
d∑
i=1
〈Φ˜′1|ϕ∗i 〉〈ϕ∗i |Φ˜′0〉 > d
(
1− ε
2
)
. (69)
But each of the d terms in the sum is no larger than 1,
and since the sum is greater than d − dε/2, each term
must be greater than d− dε/2− (d− 1) = 1− dε/2. We
conclude, then, that for any pure state |ϕ〉 on S,
Re 〈ϕ|U †1U0|ϕ〉 > 1−
dε
2
. (70)
Therefore, for any |ϕ〉
‖ (U0 − U1)|ϕ〉 ‖2< dε , (71)
and hence
‖ U0 − U1 ‖2sup< dε . (72)
This proves Lemma 4.
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